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颜建晔等,A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities,AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS,A类期刊(外文),2018/8/15。

Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia, and 颜建晔 ,A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities ,AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS,A类期刊(外文),2018/8/15。
内容简介:We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specifc prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto effcient. Hylland and Zeckhauser’s (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.