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李勇等,Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments, ECONOMICS LETTERS ,B类期刊(外文),2018/12/1。

Yi Jianxin,Wang, Hefei,李勇,Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments, ECONOMICS LETTERS ,B类期刊(外文),2018/12/1。
内容简介:In quasi-linear environments, classic theories state that it is possible to design efficient and incentivecompatible mechanisms, such as Vickrey, Clarke and Groves (VCG) mechanisms. However, once financial constraints are taken into account, we find that almost no financial constraint is compatible with efficiency and individual incentives over unrestricted domains and some restricted domains. Therefore, our results imply that even in quasi-linear environments, it is still impossible to design an efficient and incentive compatible mechanism because of financial constraints.